| For, as they do not rest on empirical grounds and as the sphere of pure reason is that of necessary truth and a priori cognition, the principle of connection in it requires universality and necessity, and consequently perfect certainty--otherwise we should have no guide to the truth at all. |
| Hence it is absurd to have an opinion in pure mathematics; we must know, or abstain from forming a judgement altogether. |
| The case is the same with the maxims of morality. |
| For we must not hazard an action on the mere opinion that it is allowed, but we must know it to be so. |
| In the transcendental sphere of reason, on the other hand, the term opinion is too weak, while the word knowledge is too strong. |
| From the merely speculative point of view, therefore, we cannot form a judgement at all. |
| For the subjective grounds of a judgement, such as produce belief, cannot be admitted in speculative inquiries, inasmuch as they cannot stand without empirical support and are incapable of being communicated to others in equal measure. |
| But it is only from the practical point of view that a theoretically insufficient judgement can be termed belief. |
| Now the practical reference is either to skill or to morality; to the former, when the end proposed is arbitrary and accidental, to the latter, when it is absolutely necessary. |
| If we propose to ourselves any end whatever, the conditions of its attainment are hypothetically necessary. |
| The necessity is subjectively, but still only comparatively, sufficient, if I am acquainted with no other conditions under which the end can be attained. |
| On the other hand, it is sufficient, absolutely and for every one, if I know for certain that no one can be acquainted with any other conditions under which the attainment of the proposed end would be possible. |
| In the former case my supposition--my judgement with regard to certain conditions--is a merely accidental belief; in the latter it is a necessary belief. |
| The physician must pursue some course in the case of a patient who is in danger, but is ignorant of the nature of the disease. |
| He observes the symptoms, and concludes, according to the best of his judgement, that it is a case of phthisis. |
| His belief is, even in his own judgement, only contingent; another man might, perhaps come nearer the truth. |
| Such a belief, contingent indeed, but still forming the ground of the actual use of means for the attainment of certain ends, I term Pragmatical belief. |
| The usual test, whether that which any one maintains is merely his persuasion, or his subjective conviction at least, that is, his firm belief, is a bet. |
| It frequently happens that a man delivers his opinions with so much boldness and assurance, that he appears to be under no apprehension as to the possibility of his being in error. |
| The offer of a bet startles him, and makes him pause. |
| Sometimes it turns out that his persuasion may be valued at a ducat, but not at ten. |