| In this respect, however, that law of nature, concerning the performance of promises, is only comprized along with the rest; and its exact observance is to be considered as an effect of the institution of government, and not the obedience to government as an effect of the obligation of a promise. |
| Though the object of our civil duties be the enforcing of our natural, yet the first [First in time, not in dignity or force.] motive of the invention, as well as performance of both, is nothing but self-interest: and since there is a separate interest in the obedience to government, from that in the performance of promises, we must also allow of a separate obligation. |
| To obey the civil magistrate is requisite to preserve order and concord in society. |
| To perform promises is requisite to beget mutual trust and confidence in the common offices of life. |
| The ends, as well as the means, are perfectly distinct; nor is the one subordinate to the other. |
| To make this more evident, let us consider, that men will often bind themselves by promises to the performance of what it would have been their interest to perform, independent of these promises; as when they would give others a fuller security, by super-adding a new obligation of interest to that which they formerly lay under. |
| The interest in the performance of promises, besides its moral obligation, is general, avowed, and of the last consequence in life. |
| Other interests may be more particular and doubtful; and we are apt to entertain a greater suspicion, that men may indulge their humour, or passion, in acting contrary to them. |
| Here, therefore, promises come naturally in play, and are often required for fuller satisfaction and security. |
| But supposing those other interests to be as general and avowed as the interest in the performance of a promise, they will be regarded as on the same footing, and men will begin to repose the same confidence in them. |
| Now this is exactly the case with regard to our civil duties, or obedience to the magistrate; without which no government coued subsist, nor any peace or order be maintained in large societies, where there are so many possessions on the one hand, and so many wants, real or imaginary, on the other. |
| Our civil duties, therefore, must soon detach themselves from our promises, and acquire a separate force and influence. |
| The interest in both is of the very same kind: It is general, avowed, and prevails in all times and places. |
| There is, then, no pretext of reason for founding the one upon the other; while each of them has a foundation peculiar to itself. |
| We might as well resolve the obligation to abstain from the possessions of others, into the obligation of a promise, as that of allegiance. |
| The interests are not more distinct in the one case than the other. |
| A regard to property is not more necessary to natural society, than obedience is to civil society or government; nor is the former society more necessary to the being of mankind, than the latter to their well-being and happiness. |
| In short, if the performance of promises be advantageous, so is obedience to government: If the former interest be general, so is the latter: If the one interest be obvious and avowed, so is the other. |
| And as these two rules are founded on like obligations of interest, each of them must have a peculiar authority, independent of the other. |
| But it is not only the natural obligations of interest, which are distinct in promises and allegiance; but also the moral obligations of honour and conscience: Nor does the merit or demerit of the one depend in the least upon that of the other. |
| And indeed, if we consider the close connexion there is betwixt the natural and moral obligations, we shall find this conclusion to be entirely unavoidable. |