| I have observed, that though self be the object of the first set of passions, and some other person of the second, yet these objects cannot alone be the causes of the passions; as having each of them a relation to two contrary affections, which must from the very first moment destroy each other. |
| Here then is the situation of the mind, as I have already described it. |
| It has certain organs naturally fitted to produce a passion; that passion, when produced, naturally turns the view to a certain object. |
| But this not being sufficient to produce the passion, there is required some other emotion, which by a double relation of impressions and ideas may set these principles in action, and bestow on them their first impulse. |
| This situation is still more remarkable with regard to the appetite of generation. |
| Sex is not only the object, but also the cause of the appetite. |
| We not only turn our view to it, when actuated by that appetite; but the reflecting on it suffices to excite the appetite. |
| But as this cause loses its force by too great frequency, it is necessary it should be quickened by some new impulse; and that impulse we find to arise from the beauty of the person; that is, from a double relation of impressions and ideas. |
| Since this double relation is necessary where an affection has both a distinct cause, and object, how much more so, where it has only a distinct object, without any determinate cause? |
| SECT. XII OF THE LOVE AND HATRED OF ANIMALS |
| But to pass from the passions of love and hatred, and from their mixtures and compositions, as they appear m man, to the same affections, as they display themselves in brutes; we may observe, not only that love and hatred are common to the whole sensitive creation, but likewise that their causes, as above-explained, are of so simple a nature, that they may easily be supposed to operate on mere animals. |
| There is no force of reflection or penetration required. |
| Every thing is conducted by springs and principles, which are not peculiar to man, or any one species of animals. |
| The conclusion from this is obvious in favour of the foregoing system. |
| Love in animals, has not for its only object animals of the same species, but extends itself farther, and comprehends almost every sensible and thinking being. |
| A dog naturally loves a man above his own species, and very commonly meets with a return of affection. |
| As animals are but little susceptible either of the pleasures or pains of the imagination, they can judge of objects only by the sensible good or evil, which they produce, and from that must regulate their affections towards them. |
| Accordingly we find, that by benefits or injuries we produce their love or hatred; and that by feeding and cherishing any animal, we quickly acquire his affections; as by beating and abusing him we never fail to draw on us his enmity and ill-will. |
| Love in beasts is not caused so much by relation, as in our species; and that because their thoughts are not so active as to trace relations, except in very obvious instances. |
| Yet it is easy to remark, that on some occasions it has a considerable influence upon them. |
| Thus acquaintance, which has the same effect as relation, always produces love in animals either to men or to each other. |