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The phrases in their context!

Extract from THE CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON

For we must not hazard an action on the mere opinion that it is allowed, but we must know it to be so.
In the transcendental sphere of reason, on the other hand, the term opinion is too weak, while the word knowledge is too strong.
From the merely speculative point of view, therefore, we cannot form a judgement at all.
For the subjective grounds of a judgement, such as produce belief, cannot be admitted in speculative inquiries, inasmuch as they cannot stand without empirical support and are incapable of being communicated to others in equal measure.
But it is only from the practical point of view that a theoretically insufficient judgement can be termed belief.
Now the practical reference is either to skill or to morality; to the former, when the end proposed is arbitrary and accidental, to the latter, when it is absolutely necessary.
If we propose to ourselves any end whatever, the conditions of its attainment are hypothetically necessary.
The necessity is subjectively, but still only comparatively, sufficient, if I am acquainted with no other conditions under which the end can be attained.
On the other hand, it is sufficient, absolutely and for every one, if I know for certain that no one can be acquainted with any other conditions under which the attainment of the proposed end would be possible.
In the former case my supposition--my judgement with regard to certain conditions--is a merely accidental belief; in the latter it is a necessary belief.
The physician must pursue some course in the case of a patient who is in danger, but is ignorant of the nature of the disease.
He observes the symptoms, and concludes, according to the best of his judgement, that it is a case of phthisis.
His belief is, even in his own judgement, only contingent; another man might, perhaps come nearer the truth.
Such a belief, contingent indeed, but still forming the ground of the actual use of means for the attainment of certain ends, I term Pragmatical belief.
The usual test, whether that which any one maintains is merely his persuasion, or his subjective conviction at least, that is, his firm belief, is a bet.
It frequently happens that a man delivers his opinions with so much boldness and assurance, that he appears to be under no apprehension as to the possibility of his being in error.
The offer of a bet startles him, and makes him pause.
Sometimes it turns out that his persuasion may be valued at a ducat, but not at ten.
For he does not hesitate, perhaps, to venture a ducat, but if it is proposed to stake ten, he immediately becomes aware of the possibility of his being mistaken--a possibility which has hitherto escaped his observation.
If we imagine to ourselves that we have to stake the happiness of our whole life on the truth of any proposition, our judgement drops its air of triumph, we take the alarm, and discover the actual strength of our belief.
Thus pragmatical belief has degrees, varying in proportion to the interests at stake.