| But before bringing these introductory remarks to a close, I beg those who really have philosophy at heart--and their number is but small--if they shall find themselves convinced by the considerations following as well as by those above, to exert themselves to preserve to the expression idea its original signification, and to take care that it be not lost among those other expressions by which all sorts of representations are loosely designated--that the interests of science may not thereby suffer. |
| We are in no want of words to denominate adequately every mode of representation, without the necessity of encroaching upon terms which are proper to others. |
| The following is a graduated list of them. |
| The genus is representation in general (representatio). |
| Under it stands representation with consciousness (perceptio). |
| A perception which relates solely to the subject as a modification of its state, is a sensation (sensatio), an objective perception is a cognition (cognitio). |
| A cognition is either an intuition or a conception (intuitus vel conceptus). |
| The former has an immediate relation to the object and is singular and individual; the latter has but a mediate relation, by means of a characteristic mark which may be common to several things. |
| A conception is either empirical or pure. |
| A pure conception, in so far as it has its origin in the understanding alone, and is not the conception of a pure sensuous image, is called notio. |
| A conception formed from notions, which transcends the possibility of experience, is an idea, or a conception of reason. |
| To one who has accustomed himself to these distinctions, it must be quite intolerable to hear the representation of the colour red called an idea. |
| It ought not even to be called a notion or conception of understanding. |
| SECTION II. Of Transcendental Ideas. |
| Transcendental analytic showed us how the mere logical form of our cognition can contain the origin of pure conceptions a priori, conceptions which represent objects antecedently to all experience, or rather, indicate the synthetical unity which alone renders possible an empirical cognition of objects. |
| The form of judgements--converted into a conception of the synthesis of intuitions--produced the categories which direct the employment of the understanding in experience. |
| This consideration warrants us to expect that the form of syllogisms, when applied to synthetical unity of intuitions, following the rule of the categories, will contain the origin of particular a priori conceptions, which we may call pure conceptions of reason or transcendental ideas, and which will determine the use of the understanding in the totality of experience according to principles. |
| The function of reason in arguments consists in the universality of a cognition according to conceptions, and the syllogism itself is a judgement which is determined a priori in the whole extent of its condition. |
| The proposition; "Caius is mortal," is one which may be obtained from experience by the aid of the understanding alone; but my wish is to find a conception which contains the condition under which the predicate of this judgement is given--in this case, the conception of man--and after subsuming under this condition, taken in its whole extent (all men are mortal), I determine according to it the cognition of the object thought, and say; "Caius is mortal." |
| Hence, in the conclusion of a syllogism we restrict a predicate to a certain object, after having thought it in the major in its whole extent under a certain condition. |
| This complete quantity of the extent in relation to such a condition is called universality (universalitas). |