| The objects of these questions contain no heterogeneous or contradictory elements, for they relate to things in themselves, and not to phenomena. |
| There would arise, indeed, a real contradiction, if reason came forward with a statement on the negative side of these questions alone. |
| As regards the criticism to which the grounds of proof on the affirmative side must be subjected, it may be freely admitted, without necessitating the surrender of the affirmative propositions, which have, at least, the interest of reason in their favour--an advantage which the opposite party cannot lay claim to. |
| I cannot agree with the opinion of several admirable thinkers--Sulzer among the rest--that, in spite of the weakness of the arguments hitherto in use, we may hope, one day, to see sufficient demonstrations of the two cardinal propositions of pure reason--the existence of a Supreme Being, and the immortality of the soul. |
| I am certain, on the contrary, that this will never be the case. |
| For on what ground can reason base such synthetical propositions, which do not relate to the objects of experience and their internal possibility? |
| But it is also demonstratively certain that no one will ever be able to maintain the contrary with the least show of probability. |
| For, as he can attempt such a proof solely upon the basis of pure reason, he is bound to prove that a Supreme Being, and a thinking subject in the character of a pure intelligence, are impossible. |
| But where will he find the knowledge which can enable him to enounce synthetical judgements in regard to things which transcend the region of experience? |
| We may, therefore, rest assured that the opposite never will be demonstrated. |
| We need not, then, have recourse to scholastic arguments; we may always admit the truth of those propositions which are consistent with the speculative interests of reason in the sphere of experience, and form, moreover, the only means of uniting the speculative with the practical interest. |
| Our opponent, who must not be considered here as a critic solely, we can be ready to meet with a non liquet which cannot fail to disconcert him; while we cannot deny his right to a similar retort, as we have on our side the advantage of the support of the subjective maxim of reason, and can therefore look upon all his sophistical arguments with calm indifference. |
| From this point of view, there is properly no antithetic of pure reason. |
| For the only arena for such a struggle would be upon the field of pure theology and psychology; but on this ground there can appear no combatant whom we need to fear. |
| Ridicule and boasting can be his only weapons; and these may be laughed at, as mere child's play. |
| This consideration restores to Reason her courage; for what source of confidence could be found, if she, whose vocation it is to destroy error, were at variance with herself and without any reasonable hope of ever reaching a state of permanent repose? |
| Everything in nature is good for some purpose. |
| Even poisons are serviceable; they destroy the evil effects of other poisons generated in our system, and must always find a place in every complete pharmacopoeia. |
| The objections raised against the fallacies and sophistries of speculative reason, are objections given by the nature of this reason itself, and must therefore have a destination and purpose which can only be for the good of humanity. |
| For what purpose has Providence raised many objects, in which we have the deepest interest, so far above us, that we vainly try to cognize them with certainty, and our powers of mental vision are rather excited than satisfied by the glimpses we may chance to seize? |
| It is very doubtful whether it is for our benefit to advance bold affirmations regarding subjects involved in such obscurity; perhaps it would even be detrimental to our best interests. |