| If this be not a good general reason for scepticism, it is at least a sufficient one (if I were not already abundantly supplied) for me to entertain a diffidence and modesty in all my decisions. |
| I shall propose the arguments on both sides, beginning with those that induced me to deny the strict and proper identity and simplicity of a self or thinking being. |
| When we talk of self or substance, we must have an idea annexed to these terms, otherwise they are altogether unintelligible. |
| Every idea is derived from preceding impressions; and we have no impression of self or substance, as something simple and individual. |
| We have, therefore, no idea of them in that sense. |
| Whatever is distinct, is distinguishable; and whatever is distinguishable, is separable by the thought or imagination. |
| All perceptions are distinct. |
| They are, therefore, distinguishable, and separable, and may be conceived as separately existent, and may exist separately, without any contradiction or absurdity. |
| When I view this table and that chimney, nothing is present to me but particular perceptions, which are of a like nature with all the other perceptions. |
| This is the doctrine of philosophers. |
| But this table, which is present to me, and the chimney, may and do exist separately. |
| This is the doctrine of the vulgar, and implies no contradiction. |
| There is no contradiction, therefore, in extending the same doctrine to all the perceptions. |
| In general, the following reasoning seems satisfactory. |
| All ideas are borrowed from preceding perceptions. |
| Our ideas of objects, therefore, are derived from that source. |
| Consequently no proposition can be intelligible or consistent with regard to objects, which is not so with regard to perceptions. |
| But it is intelligible and consistent to say, that objects exist distinct and independent, without any common simple substance or subject of inhesion. |
| This proposition, therefore, can never be absurd with regard to perceptions. |
| When I turn my reflection on myself, I never can perceive this self without some one or more perceptions; nor can I ever perceive any thing but the perceptions. |
| It is the composition of these, therefore, which forms the self. |