| For in that case, both the passions, mingling with each other by means of the relation, become mutually destructive, and leave the mind in perfect tranquility. |
| But suppose, in the third place, that the object is not a compound of good or evil, but is considered as probable or improbable in any degree; in that case I assert, that the contrary passions will both of them be present at once in the soul, and instead of destroying and tempering each other, will subsist together, and produce a third impression or affection by their union. |
| Contrary passions are not capable of destroying each other, except when their contrary movements exactly rencounter, and are opposite in their direction, as well as in the sensation they produce. |
| This exact rencounter depends upon the relations of those ideas, from which they are derived, and is more or less perfect, according to the degrees of the relation. |
| In the case of probability the contrary chances are so far related, that they determine concerning the existence or non-existence of the same object. |
| But this relation is far from being perfect; since some of the chances lie on the side of existence, and others on that of non-existence; which are objects altogether incompatible. |
| It is impossible by one steady view to survey the opposite chances, and the events dependent on them; but it is necessary, that the imagination should run alternately from the one to the other. |
| Each view of the imagination produces its peculiar passion, which decays away by degrees, and is followed by a sensible vibration after the stroke. |
| The incompatibility of the views keeps the passions from shocking in a direct line, if that expression may be allowed; and yet their relation is sufficient to mingle their fainter emotions. |
| It is after this manner that hope and fear arise from the different mixture of these opposite passions of grief and joy, and from their imperfect union and conjunction. |
| Upon the whole, contrary passions succeed each other alternately, when they arise from different objects: They mutually destroy each other, when they proceed from different parts of the same: And they subsist both of them. |
| and mingle together, when they are derived from the contrary and incompatible chances or possibilities, on which any one object depends. |
| The influence of the relations of ideas is plainly seen in this whole affair. |
| If the objects of the contrary passions be totally different, the passions are like two opposite liquors in different bottles, which have no influence on each other. |
| If the objects be intimately connected, the passions are like an alcali and an acid, which, being mingled, destroy each other. |
| If the relation be more imperfect, and consists in the contradictory views of the same object, the passions are like oil and vinegar, which, however mingled, never perfectly unite and incorporate. |
| As the hypothesis concerning hope and fear carries its own evidence along with it, we shall be the more concise in our proofs. |
| A few strong arguments are better than many weak ones. |
| The passions of fear and hope may arise when the chances are equal on both sides, and no superiority can be discovered in the one above the other. |
| Nay, in this situation the passions are rather the strongest, as the mind has then the least foundation to rest upon, and is tossed with the greatest uncertainty. |
| Throw in a superior degree of probability to the side of grief, you immediately see that passion diffuse itself over the composition, and tincture it into fear. |