| But the relation, which is esteemed the closest, and which of all others produces most commonly the passion of pride, is that of property. |
| This relation it will be impossible for me fully to explain before I come to treat of justice and the other moral virtues. |
| It is sufficient to observe on this occasion, that property may be defined, such a relation betwixt a person and an. |
| object as permits him, but forbids any other, the free use and possession of it, without violating the laws of justice and moral equity. |
| If justice, therefore, be a virtue, which has a natural and original influence on the human mind, property may be looked upon as a particular species of causation; whether we consider the liberty it gives the proprietor to operate as he please upon the object or the advantages, which he reaps from it. |
| It is the same case, if justice, according to the system of certain philosophers, should be esteemed an artificial and not a natural virtue. |
| For then honour, and custom, and civil laws supply the place of natural conscience, and produce, in some degree, the same effects. |
| This in the mean time is certain, that the mention of the property naturally carries our thought to the proprietor, and of the proprietor to the property; which being a proof of a perfect relation of ideas is all that is requisite to our present purpose. |
| A relation of ideas, joined to that of impressions, always produces a transition of affections; and therefore, whenever any pleasure or pain arises from an object, connected with us by property. |
| we may be certain, that either pride or humility must arise from this conjunction of relations; if the foregoing system be solid and satisfactory. |
| And whether it be so or not, we may soon satisfy ourselves by the most cursory view of human life. |
| Every thing belonging to a vain man is the best that is any where to be found. |
| His houses, equipage, furniture, doaths, horses, hounds, excel all others in his conceit; and it is easy to observe, that from the least advantage in any of these, he draws a new subject of pride and vanity. |
| His wine, if you'll believe him, has a finer flavour than any other; his cookery is more exquisite; his table more orderly; his servants more expert; the air, in which he lives, more healthful; the soil he cultivates more fertile; his fruits ripen earlier and to greater perfection: Such a thing is remarkable for its novelty; such another for its antiquity: This is the workmanship of a famous artist; that belonged once to such a prince or great man: All objects, in a word, that are useful, beautiful or surprising, or are related to such, may, by means of property, give rise to this passion. |
| These agree in giving pleasure, and agree in nothing else. |
| This alone is common to them; and therefore must be the quality that produces the passion, which is their common effect. |
| As every new instance is a new argument, and as the instances are here without number, I may venture to affirm, that scarce any system was ever so fully proved by experience, as that which I have here advanced. |
| If the property of any thing, that gives pleasure either by its utility, beauty or novelty, produces also pride by a double relation of impressions and ideas; we need not be surprized, that the power of acquiring this property, should have the same effect. |
| Now riches are to be considered as the power of acquiring the property of what pleases; and it is only in this view they have any influence on the passions. |
| Paper will, on many occasions, be considered as riches, and that because it may convey the power of acquiring money: And money is not riches, as it is a metal endowed with certain qualities of solidity, weight and fusibility; but only as it has a relation to the pleasures and conveniences of life. |
| Taking then this for granted, which is in itself so evident, we may draw from it one of the strongest arguments I have yet employed to prove the influence of the double relations on pride and humility. |