| Every one of himself will readily perceive the difference betwixt feeling and thinking. |
| The common degrees of these are easily distinguished; though it is not impossible but in particular instances they may very nearly approach to each other. |
| Thus in sleep, in a fever, in madness, or in any very violent emotions of soul, our ideas may approach to our impressions, As on the other hand it sometimes happens, that our impressions are so faint and low, that we cannot distinguish them from our ideas. |
| But notwithstanding this near resemblance in a few instances, they are in general so very different, that no-one can make a scruple to rank them under distinct heads, and assign to each a peculiar name to mark the difference [Footnote 1.]. |
| [Footnote 1. I here make use of these terms, impression and idea, in a sense different from what is usual, and I hope this liberty will be allowed me. |
| Perhaps I rather restore the word, idea, to its original sense, from which Mr LOCKE had perverted it, in making it stand for all our perceptions. |
| By the terms of impression I would not be understood to express the manner, in which our lively perceptions are produced in the soul, but merely the perceptions themselves; for which there is no particular name either in the English or any other language, that I know of.] |
| There is another division of our perceptions, which it will be convenient to observe, and which extends itself both to our impressions and ideas. |
| This division is into SIMPLE and COMPLEX. |
| Simple perceptions or impressions and ideas are such as admit of no distinction nor separation. |
| The complex are the contrary to these, and may be distinguished into parts. |
| Though a particular colour, taste, and smell, are qualities all united together in this apple, it is easy to perceive they are not the same, but are at least distinguishable from each other. |
| Having by these divisions given an order and arrangement to our objects, we may now apply ourselves to consider with the more accuracy their qualities and relations. |
| The first circumstance, that strikes my eye, is the great resemblance betwixt our impressions and ideas in every other particular, except their degree of force and vivacity. |
| The one seem to be in a manner the reflexion of the other; so that all the perceptions of the mind are double, and appear both as impressions and ideas. |
| When I shut my eyes and think of my chamber, the ideas I form are exact representations of the impressions I felt; nor is there any circumstance of the one, which is not to be found in the other. |
| In running over my other perceptions, I find still the same resemblance and representation. |
| Ideas and impressions appear always to correspond to each other. |
| This circumstance seems to me remarkable, and engages my attention for a moment. |
| Upon a more accurate survey I find I have been carried away too far by the first appearance, and that I must make use of the distinction of perceptions into simple and complex, to limit this general decision, that all our ideas and impressions are resembling. |
| I observe, that many of our complex ideas never had impressions, that corresponded to them, and that many of our complex impressions never are exactly copied in ideas. |