| Were private benevolence the original motive to justice, a man would not be obliged to leave others in the possession of more than he is obliged to give them. |
| At least the difference would be very inconsiderable. |
| Men generally fix their affections more on what they are possessed of, than on what they never enjoyed: For this reason, it would be greater cruelty to dispossess a man of any thing, than not to give it him. |
| But who will assert, that this is the only foundation of justice? |
| Besides, we must consider, that the chief reason, why men attach themselves so much to their possessions is, that they consider them as their property, and as secured to them inviolably by the laws of society. |
| But this is a secondary consideration, and dependent on the preceding notions of justice and property. |
| A man's property is supposed to be fenced against every mortal, in every possible case. |
| But private benevolence is, and ought to be, weaker in some persons, than in others: And in many, or indeed in most persons, must absolutely fail. |
| Private benevolence, therefore, is not the original motive of justice. |
| From all this it follows, that we have no real or universal motive for observing the laws of equity, but the very equity and merit of that observance; and as no action can be equitable or meritorious, where it cannot arise from some separate motive, there is here an evident sophistry and reasoning in a circle. |
| Unless, therefore, we will allow, that nature has established a sophistry, and rendered it necessary and unavoidable, we must allow, that the sense of justice and injustice is not derived from nature, but arises artificially, though necessarily from education, and human conventions. |
| I shall add, as a corollary to this reasoning, that since no action can be laudable or blameable, without some motives or impelling passions, distinct from the sense of morals, these distinct passions must have a great influence on that sense. |
| It is according to their general force in human nature, that we blame or praise. |
| In judging of the beauty of animal bodies, we always carry in our eye the oeconomy of a certain species; and where the limbs and features observe that proportion, which is common to the species, we pronounce them handsome and beautiful. |
| In like manner we always consider the natural and usual force of the passions, when we determine concerning vice and virtue; and if the passions depart very much from the common measures on either side, they are always disapproved as vicious. |
| A man naturally loves his children better than his nephews, his nephews better than his cousins, his cousins better than strangers, where every thing else is equal. |
| Hence arise our common measures of duty, in preferring the one to the other. |
| Our sense of duty always follows the common and natural course of our passions. |
| To avoid giving offence, I must here observe, that when I deny justice to be a natural virtue, I make use of the word, natural, only as opposed to artificial. |
| In another sense of the word; as no principle of the human mind is more natural than a sense of virtue; so no virtue is more natural than justice. |
| Mankind is an inventive species; and where an invention is obvious and absolutely necessary, it may as properly be said to be natural as any thing that proceeds immediately from original principles, without the intervention of thought or reflection. |