| The direct survey of another's pleasure naturally gives us plcasure, and therefore produces pain when cornpared with our own. |
| His pain, considered in itself, is painful to us, but augments the idea of our own happiness, and gives us pleasure. |
| Nor will it appear strange, that we may feel a reverst sensation from the happiness and misery of others; since we find the same comparison may give us a kind of malice against ourselves, and make us rejoice for our pains, and grieve for our pleasures. |
| Thus the prospect of past pain is agreeable, when we are satisfyed with our present condition; as on the other hand our past pleasures give us uneasiness, when we enjoy nothing at present equal to them. |
| The comparison being the same, as when we reflect on the sentiments of others, must be attended with the same effects. |
| Nay a person may extend this malice against himself, even to his present fortune, and carry it so far as designedly to seek affliction, and encrease his pains and sorrows. |
| This may happen upon two occasions. |
| First, Upon the distress and misfortune of a friend, or person dear to him. |
| Secondly, Upon the feeling any remorses for a crime, of which he has been guilty. |
| It is from the principle of comparison that both these irregular appetites for evil arise. |
| A person, who indulges himself in any pleasure, while his friend lies under affliction, feels the reflected uneasiness from his friend more sensibly by a comparison with the original pleasure, which he himself enjoys. |
| This contrast, indeed, ought also to inliven the present pleasure. |
| But as grief is here supposed to be the predominant passion, every addition falls to that side, and is swallowed up in it, without operating in the least upon the contrary affection. |
| It is the same case with those penances, which men inflict on themselves for their past sins and failings. |
| When a. criminal reflects on the punishment he deserves, the idea of it is magnifyed by a comparison with his present ease and satisfaction; which forces him, in a manner, to seek uneasiness, in order to avoid so disagreeable a contrast. |
| This reasoning will account for the origin of envy as well as of malice. |
| The only difference betwixt these passions lies in this, that envy is excited by some present enjoyment of another, which by comparison diminishes our idea of our own: Whereas malice is the unprovoked desire of producing evil to another, in order to reap a pleasure from the comparison. |
| The enjoyment, which is the object of envy, is commonly superior to our own. |
| A superiority naturally seems to overshade us, and presents a disagreeable comparison. |
| But even in the case of an inferiority, we still desire a greater distance, in order to augment, still more the idea of ourself. |
| When this distance diminishes, the comparison is less to our advantage; and consequently gives us less pleasure, and is even disagreeable. |