| A great object, therefore, succeeding a small one makes a great emotion succeed a small one. |
| Now a great emotion succeeding a small one becomes still greater, and rises beyond its ordinary proportion. |
| But as there is a certain degree of an emotion, which commonly attends every magnitude of a-n object; when the emotion encreases, we naturally imagine that the object has likewise encreased. |
| The effect conveys our view to its usual cause, a certain degree of emotion to a certain magnitude of the object; nor do we consider, that comparison may change the emotion without changing anything in the object. |
| Those who are acquainted with the metaphysical part of optics and know how we transfer the judgments and conclusions of the understanding to the senses, will easily conceive this whole operation. |
| But leaving this new discovery of an impression, that secretly attends every idea; we must at least allow of that principle, from whence the discovery arose, that objects appear greater or less by a comparison with others. |
| We have so many instances of this, that it is impossible we can dispute its veracity; and it is from this principle I derive the passions of malice and envy. |
| It is evident we must receive a greater or less satisfaction or uneasiness from reflecting on our own condition and circumstances, in proportion as they appear more or less fortunate or unhappy, in proportion to the degrees of riches, and power, and merit, and reputation, which we think ourselves possest of. |
| Now as we seldom judge of objects from their intrinsic value, but form our notions of them from a comparison with other objects; it follows, that according as we observe a greater or less share of happiness or misery in others, we must make an estimate of our own, and feel a consequent pain or pleasure. |
| The misery of another gives us a more lively idea of our happiness, and his happiness of our misery. |
| The former, therefore, produces delight; and the latter uneasiness. |
| Here then is a kind of pity reverst, or contrary sensations arising in the beholder, from those which are felt by the person, whom he considers. |
| In general we may observe, that in all kinds of comparison an object makes us always receive from another, to which it is compared, a sensation contrary to what arises from itself in its direct and immediate survey. |
| A small object makes a great one appear still greater. |
| A great object makes a little one appear less. |
| Deformity of itself produces uneasiness; but makes us receive new pleasure by its contrast with a beautiful object, whose beauty is augmented by it; as on the other hand, beauty, which of itself produces pleasure, makes us receive a new pain by the contrast with any thing ugiy, whose deformity it augments. |
| The case, therefore, must be the same with happiness and misery. |
| The direct survey of another's pleasure naturally gives us plcasure, and therefore produces pain when cornpared with our own. |
| His pain, considered in itself, is painful to us, but augments the idea of our own happiness, and gives us pleasure. |
| Nor will it appear strange, that we may feel a reverst sensation from the happiness and misery of others; since we find the same comparison may give us a kind of malice against ourselves, and make us rejoice for our pains, and grieve for our pleasures. |
| Thus the prospect of past pain is agreeable, when we are satisfyed with our present condition; as on the other hand our past pleasures give us uneasiness, when we enjoy nothing at present equal to them. |