| The necessity is subjectively, but still only comparatively, sufficient, if I am acquainted with no other conditions under which the end can be attained. |
| On the other hand, it is sufficient, absolutely and for every one, if I know for certain that no one can be acquainted with any other conditions under which the attainment of the proposed end would be possible. |
| In the former case my supposition--my judgement with regard to certain conditions--is a merely accidental belief; in the latter it is a necessary belief. |
| The physician must pursue some course in the case of a patient who is in danger, but is ignorant of the nature of the disease. |
| He observes the symptoms, and concludes, according to the best of his judgement, that it is a case of phthisis. |
| His belief is, even in his own judgement, only contingent; another man might, perhaps come nearer the truth. |
| Such a belief, contingent indeed, but still forming the ground of the actual use of means for the attainment of certain ends, I term Pragmatical belief. |
| The usual test, whether that which any one maintains is merely his persuasion, or his subjective conviction at least, that is, his firm belief, is a bet. |
| It frequently happens that a man delivers his opinions with so much boldness and assurance, that he appears to be under no apprehension as to the possibility of his being in error. |
| The offer of a bet startles him, and makes him pause. |
| Sometimes it turns out that his persuasion may be valued at a ducat, but not at ten. |
| For he does not hesitate, perhaps, to venture a ducat, but if it is proposed to stake ten, he immediately becomes aware of the possibility of his being mistaken--a possibility which has hitherto escaped his observation. |
| If we imagine to ourselves that we have to stake the happiness of our whole life on the truth of any proposition, our judgement drops its air of triumph, we take the alarm, and discover the actual strength of our belief. |
| Thus pragmatical belief has degrees, varying in proportion to the interests at stake. |
| Now, in cases where we cannot enter upon any course of action in reference to some object, and where, accordingly, our judgement is purely theoretical, we can still represent to ourselves, in thought, the possibility of a course of action, for which we suppose that we have sufficient grounds, if any means existed of ascertaining the truth of the matter. |
| Thus we find in purely theoretical judgements an analogon of practical judgements, to which the word belief may properly be applied, and which we may term doctrinal belief. |
| I should not hesitate to stake my all on the truth of the proposition- if there were any possibility of bringing it to the test of experience--that, at least, some one of the planets, which we see, is inhabited. |
| Hence I say that I have not merely the opinion, but the strong belief, on the correctness of which I would stake even many of the advantages of life, that there are inhabitants in other worlds. |
| Now we must admit that the doctrine of the existence of God belongs to doctrinal belief. |
| For, although in respect to the theoretical cognition of the universe I do not require to form any theory which necessarily involves this idea, as the condition of my explanation of the phenomena which the universe presents, but, on the contrary, am rather bound so to use my reason as if everything were mere nature, still teleological unity is so important a condition of the application of my reason to nature, that it is impossible for me to ignore it--especially since, in addition to these considerations, abundant examples of it are supplied by experience. |
| But the sole condition, so far as my knowledge extends, under which this unity can be my guide in the investigation of nature, is the assumption that a supreme intelligence has ordered all things according to the wisest ends. |