| For, as regards the subterfuge adopted by those who endeavour to evade the consequence--that, if the world is limited as to space and time, the infinite void must determine the existence of actual things in regard to their dimensions--it arises solely from the fact that instead of a sensuous world, an intelligible world--of which nothing is known--is cogitated; instead of a real beginning (an existence, which is preceded by a period in which nothing exists), an existence which presupposes no other condition than that of time; and, instead of limits of extension, boundaries of the universe. |
| But the question relates to the mundus phaenomenon, and its quantity; and in this case we cannot make abstraction of the conditions of sensibility, without doing away with the essential reality of this world itself. |
| The world of sense, if it is limited, must necessarily lie in the infinite void. |
| If this, and with it space as the a priori condition of the possibility of phenomena, is left out of view, the whole world of sense disappears. |
| In our problem is this alone considered as given. |
| The mundus intelligibilis is nothing but the general conception of a world, in which abstraction has been made of all conditions of intuition, and in relation to which no synthetical proposition--either affirmative or negative--is possible. |
| SECOND CONFLICT OF TRANSCENDENTAL IDEAS. |
| THESIS. |
| Every composite substance in the world consists of simple parts; and there exists nothing that is not either itself simple, or composed of simple parts. |
| PROOF. |
| For, grant that composite substances do not consist of simple parts; in this case, if all combination or composition were annihilated in thought, no composite part, and (as, by the supposition, there do not exist simple parts) no simple part would exist. |
| Consequently, no substance; consequently, nothing would exist. |
| Either, then, it is impossible to annihilate composition in thought; or, after such annihilation, there must remain something that subsists without composition, that is, something that is simple. |
| But in the former case the composite could not itself consist of substances, because with substances composition is merely a contingent relation, apart from which they must still exist as self-subsistent beings. |
| Now, as this case contradicts the supposition, the second must contain the truth- that the substantial composite in the world consists of simple parts. |
| It follows, as an immediate inference, that the things in the world are all, without exception, simple beings--that composition is merely an external condition pertaining to them--and that, although we never can separate and isolate the elementary substances from the state of composition, reason must cogitate these as the primary subjects of all composition, and consequently, as prior thereto--and as simple substances. |
| ANTITHESIS. |
| No composite thing in the world consists of simple parts; and there does not exist in the world any simple substance. |
| PROOF. |
| Let it be supposed that a composite thing (as substance) consists of simple parts. |
| Inasmuch as all external relation, consequently all composition of substances, is possible only in space; the space, occupied by that which is composite, must consist of the same number of parts as is contained in the composite. |