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The phrases in their context!

Extract from THE CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON

If we add the condition to the conception, and say, "All things, as phenomena, that is, objects of sensuous intuition, are in time," then the proposition has its sound objective validity and universality a priorI. What we have now set forth teaches, therefore, the empirical reality of time; that is, its objective validity in reference to all objects which can ever be presented to our senses.
And as our intuition is always sensuous, no object ever can be presented to us in experience, which does not come under the conditions of time.
On the other hand, we deny to time all claim to absolute reality; that is, we deny that it, without having regard to the form of our sensuous intuition, absolutely inheres in things as a condition or property.
Such properties as belong to objects as things in themselves never can be presented to us through the medium of the senses.
Herein consists, therefore, the transcendental ideality of time, according to which, if we abstract the subjective conditions of sensuous intuition, it is nothing, and cannot be reckoned as subsisting or inhering in objects as things in themselves, independently of its relation to our intuition.
this ideality, like that of space, is not to be proved or illustrated by fallacious analogies with sensations, for this reason--that in such arguments or illustrations, we make the presupposition that the phenomenon, in which such and such predicates inhere, has objective reality, while in this case we can only find such an objective reality as is itself empirical, that is, regards the object as a mere phenomenon.
In reference to this subject, see the remark in Section I (SS 4)
SS 8. Elucidation.
Against this theory, which grants empirical reality to time, but denies to it absolute and transcendental reality, I have heard from intelligent men an objection so unanimously urged that I conclude that it must naturally present itself to every reader to whom these considerations are novel.
It runs thus; "Changes are real" (this the continual change in our own representations demonstrates, even though the existence of all external phenomena, together with their changes, is denied).
Now, changes are only possible in time, and therefore time must be something real.
But there is no difficulty in answering this.
I grant the whole argument.
Time, no doubt, is something real, that is, it is the real form of our internal intuition.
It therefore has subjective reality, in reference to our internal experience, that is, I have really the representation of time and of my determinations therein.
Time, therefore, is not to be regarded as an object, but as the mode of representation of myself as an object.
But if I could intuite myself, or be intuited by another being, without this condition of sensibility, then those very determinations which we now represent to ourselves as changes, would present to us a knowledge in which the representation of time, and consequently of change, would not appear.
The empirical reality of time, therefore, remains, as the condition of all our experience.
But absolute reality, according to what has been said above, cannot be granted it.
Time is nothing but the form of our internal intuition.* If we take away from it the special condition of our sensibility, the conception of time also vanishes; and it inheres not in the objects themselves, but solely in the subject (or mind) which intuites them.
[*Footnote; I can indeed say "my representations follow one another, or are successive"; but this means only that we are conscious of them as in a succession, that is, according to the form of the internal sense.