| It no longer objective we, make abstraction of the sensuousness of our intuition, in other words, of that mode of representation which is peculiar to us, and speak of things in general. |
| Time is therefore merely a subjective condition of our (human) intuition (which is always sensuous, that is, so far as we are affected by objects), and in itself, independently of the mind or subject, is nothing. |
| Nevertheless, in respect of all phenomena, consequently of all things which come within the sphere of our experience, it is necessarily objective. |
| We cannot say, "All things are in time," because in this conception of things in general, we abstract and make no mention of any sort of intuition of things. |
| But this is the proper condition under which time belongs to our representation of objects. |
| If we add the condition to the conception, and say, "All things, as phenomena, that is, objects of sensuous intuition, are in time," then the proposition has its sound objective validity and universality a priorI. What we have now set forth teaches, therefore, the empirical reality of time; that is, its objective validity in reference to all objects which can ever be presented to our senses. |
| And as our intuition is always sensuous, no object ever can be presented to us in experience, which does not come under the conditions of time. |
| On the other hand, we deny to time all claim to absolute reality; that is, we deny that it, without having regard to the form of our sensuous intuition, absolutely inheres in things as a condition or property. |
| Such properties as belong to objects as things in themselves never can be presented to us through the medium of the senses. |
| Herein consists, therefore, the transcendental ideality of time, according to which, if we abstract the subjective conditions of sensuous intuition, it is nothing, and cannot be reckoned as subsisting or inhering in objects as things in themselves, independently of its relation to our intuition. |
| this ideality, like that of space, is not to be proved or illustrated by fallacious analogies with sensations, for this reason--that in such arguments or illustrations, we make the presupposition that the phenomenon, in which such and such predicates inhere, has objective reality, while in this case we can only find such an objective reality as is itself empirical, that is, regards the object as a mere phenomenon. |
| In reference to this subject, see the remark in Section I (SS 4) |
| SS 8. Elucidation. |
| Against this theory, which grants empirical reality to time, but denies to it absolute and transcendental reality, I have heard from intelligent men an objection so unanimously urged that I conclude that it must naturally present itself to every reader to whom these considerations are novel. |
| It runs thus; "Changes are real" (this the continual change in our own representations demonstrates, even though the existence of all external phenomena, together with their changes, is denied). |
| Now, changes are only possible in time, and therefore time must be something real. |
| But there is no difficulty in answering this. |
| I grant the whole argument. |
| Time, no doubt, is something real, that is, it is the real form of our internal intuition. |
| It therefore has subjective reality, in reference to our internal experience, that is, I have really the representation of time and of my determinations therein. |
| Time, therefore, is not to be regarded as an object, but as the mode of representation of myself as an object. |