| Thus we find in purely theoretical judgements an analogon of practical judgements, to which the word belief may properly be applied, and which we may term doctrinal belief. |
| I should not hesitate to stake my all on the truth of the proposition- if there were any possibility of bringing it to the test of experience--that, at least, some one of the planets, which we see, is inhabited. |
| Hence I say that I have not merely the opinion, but the strong belief, on the correctness of which I would stake even many of the advantages of life, that there are inhabitants in other worlds. |
| Now we must admit that the doctrine of the existence of God belongs to doctrinal belief. |
| For, although in respect to the theoretical cognition of the universe I do not require to form any theory which necessarily involves this idea, as the condition of my explanation of the phenomena which the universe presents, but, on the contrary, am rather bound so to use my reason as if everything were mere nature, still teleological unity is so important a condition of the application of my reason to nature, that it is impossible for me to ignore it--especially since, in addition to these considerations, abundant examples of it are supplied by experience. |
| But the sole condition, so far as my knowledge extends, under which this unity can be my guide in the investigation of nature, is the assumption that a supreme intelligence has ordered all things according to the wisest ends. |
| Consequently, the hypothesis of a wise author of the universe is necessary for my guidance in the investigation of nature--is the condition under which alone I can fulfil an end which is contingent indeed, but by no means unimportant. |
| Moreover, since the result of my attempts so frequently confirms the utility of this assumption, and since nothing decisive can be adduced against it, it follows that it would be saying far too little to term my judgement, in this case, a mere opinion, and that, even in this theoretical connection, I may assert that I firmly believe in God. |
| Still, if we use words strictly, this must not be called a practical, but a doctrinal belief, which the theology of nature (physico-theology) must also produce in my mind. |
| In the wisdom of a Supreme Being, and in the shortness of life, so inadequate to the development of the glorious powers of human nature, we may find equally sufficient grounds for a doctrinal belief in the future life of the human soul. |
| The expression of belief is, in such cases, an expression of modesty from the objective point of view, but, at the same time, of firm confidence, from the subjective. |
| If I should venture to term this merely theoretical judgement even so much as a hypothesis which I am entitled to assume; a more complete conception, with regard to another world and to the cause of the world, might then be justly required of me than I am, in reality, able to give. |
| For, if I assume anything, even as a mere hypothesis, I must, at least, know so much of the properties of such a being as will enable me, not to form the conception, but to imagine the existence of it. |
| But the word belief refers only to the guidance which an idea gives me, and to its subjective influence on the conduct of my reason, which forces me to hold it fast, though I may not be in a position to give a speculative account of it. |
| But mere doctrinal belief is, to some extent, wanting in stability. |
| We often quit our hold of it, in consequence of the difficulties which occur in speculation, though in the end we inevitably return to it again. |
| It is quite otherwise with moral belief. |
| For in this sphere action is absolutely necessary, that is, I must act in obedience to the moral law in all points. |
| The end is here incontrovertibly established, and there is only one condition possible, according to the best of my perception, under which this end can harmonize with all other ends, and so have practical validity--namely, the existence of a God and of a future world. |
| I know also, to a certainty, that no one can be acquainted with any other conditions which conduct to the same unity of ends under the moral law. |
| But since the moral precept is, at the same time, my maxim (as reason requires that it should be), I am irresistibly constrained to believe in the existence of God and in a future life; and I am sure that nothing can make me waver in this belief, since I should thereby overthrow my moral maxims, the renunciation of which would render me hateful in my own eyes. |