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The phrases in their context!

Extract from THE CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON

The division is contained only in the progressing decomposition--in the regress itself, which is the condition of the possibility and actuality of the series.
Now, as this regress is infinite, all the members (parts) to which it attains must be contained in the given whole as an aggregate.
But the complete series of division is not contained therein.
For this series, being infinite in succession and always incomplete, cannot represent an infinite number of members, and still less a composition of these members into a whole.
To apply this remark to space.
Every limited part of space presented to intuition is a whole, the parts of which are always spaces--to whatever extent subdivided.
Every limited space is hence divisible to infinity.
Let us again apply the remark to an external phenomenon enclosed in limits, that is, a body.
The divisibility of a body rests upon the divisibility of space, which is the condition of the possibility of the body as an extended whole.
A body is consequently divisible to infinity, though it does not, for that reason, consist of an infinite number of parts.
It certainly seems that, as a body must be cogitated as substance in space, the law of divisibility would not be applicable to it as substance.
For we may and ought to grant, in the case of space, that division or decomposition, to any extent, never can utterly annihilate composition (that is to say, the smallest part of space must still consist of spaces); otherwise space would entirely cease to exist- which is impossible.
But, the assertion on the other band that when all composition in matter is annihilated in thought, nothing remains, does not seem to harmonize with the conception of substance, which must be properly the subject of all composition and must remain, even after the conjunction of its attributes in space- which constituted a body--is annihilated in thought.
But this is not the case with substance in the phenomenal world, which is not a thing in itself cogitated by the pure category.
Phenomenal substance is not an absolute subject; it is merely a permanent sensuous image, and nothing more than an intuition, in which the unconditioned is not to be found.
But, although this rule of progress to infinity is legitimate and applicable to the subdivision of a phenomenon, as a mere occupation or filling of space, it is not applicable to a whole consisting of a number of distinct parts and constituting a quantum discretum--that is to say, an organized body.
It cannot be admitted that every part in an organized whole is itself organized, and that, in analysing it to infinity, we must always meet with organized parts; although we may allow that the parts of the matter which we decompose in infinitum, may be organized.
For the infinity of the division of a phenomenon in space rests altogether on the fact that the divisibility of a phenomenon is given only in and through this infinity, that is, an undetermined number of parts is given, while the parts themselves are given and determined only in and through the subdivision; in a word, the infinity of the division necessarily presupposes that the whole is not already divided in se.
Hence our division determines a number of parts in the whole--a number which extends just as far as the actual regress in the division; while, on the other hand, the very notion of a body organized to infinity represents the whole as already and in itself divided.
We expect, therefore, to find in it a determinate, but at the same time, infinite, number of parts--which is self-contradictory.
For we should thus have a whole containing a series of members which could not be completed in any regress--which is infinite, and at the same time complete in an organized composite.