| The word absolute is one of the few words which, in its original signification, was perfectly adequate to the conception it was intended to convey--a conception which no other word in the same language exactly suits, and the loss--or, which is the same thing, the incautious and loose employment--of which must be followed by the loss of the conception itself. |
| And, as it is a conception which occupies much of the attention of reason, its loss would be greatly to the detriment of all transcendental philosophy. |
| The word absolute is at present frequently used to denote that something can be predicated of a thing considered in itself and intrinsically. |
| In this sense absolutely possible would signify that which is possible in itself (interne)- which is, in fact, the least that one can predicate of an object. |
| On the other hand, it is sometimes employed to indicate that a thing is valid in all respects--for example, absolute sovereignty. |
| Absolutely possible would in this sense signify that which is possible in all relations and in every respect; and this is the most that can be predicated of the possibility of a thing. |
| Now these significations do in truth frequently coincide. |
| Thus, for example, that which is intrinsically impossible, is also impossible in all relations, that is, absolutely impossible. |
| But in most cases they differ from each other toto caelo, and I can by no means conclude that, because a thing is in itself possible, it is also possible in all relations, and therefore absolutely. |
| Nay, more, I shall in the sequel show that absolute necessity does not by any means depend on internal necessity, and that, therefore, it must not be considered as synonymous with it. |
| Of an opposite which is intrinsically impossible, we may affirm that it is in all respects impossible, and that, consequently, the thing itself, of which this is the opposite, is absolutely necessary; but I cannot reason conversely and say, the opposite of that which is absolutely necessary is intrinsically impossible, that is, that the absolute necessity of things is an internal necessity. |
| For this internal necessity is in certain cases a mere empty word with which the least conception cannot be connected, while the conception of the necessity of a thing in all relations possesses very peculiar determinations. |
| Now as the loss of a conception of great utility in speculative science cannot be a matter of indifference to the philosopher, I trust that the proper determination and careful preservation of the expression on which the conception depends will likewise be not indifferent to him. |
| In this enlarged signification, then, shall I employ the word absolute, in opposition to that which is valid only in some particular respect; for the latter is restricted by conditions, the former is valid without any restriction whatever. |
| Now the transcendental conception of reason has for its object nothing else than absolute totality in the synthesis of conditions and does not rest satisfied till it has attained to the absolutely, that is, in all respects and relations, unconditioned. |
| For pure reason leaves to the understanding everything that immediately relates to the object of intuition or rather to their synthesis in imagination. |
| The former restricts itself to the absolute totality in the employment of the conceptions of the understanding and aims at carrying out the synthetical unity which is cogitated in the category, even to the unconditioned. |
| This unity may hence be called the rational unity of phenomena, as the other, which the category expresses, may be termed the unity of the understanding. |
| Reason, therefore, has an immediate relation to the use of the understanding, not indeed in so far as the latter contains the ground of possible experience (for the conception of the absolute totality of conditions is not a conception that can be employed in experience, because no experience is unconditioned), but solely for the purpose of directing it to a certain unity, of which the understanding has no conception, and the aim of which is to collect into an absolute whole all acts of the understanding. |
| Hence the objective employment of the pure conceptions of reason is always transcendent, while that of the pure conceptions of the understanding must, according to their nature, be always immanent, inasmuch as they are limited to possible experience. |
| I understand by idea a necessary conception of reason, to which no corresponding object can be discovered in the world of sense. |