| But in this case, laws are nothing more than limitations of our freedom upon conditions under which it subsists in perfect harmony with itself; they consequently have for their object that which is completely our own work, and of which we ourselves may be the cause by means of these conceptions. |
| But how objects as things in themselves- how the nature of things is subordinated to principles and is to be determined. |
| according to conceptions, is a question which it seems well nigh impossible to answer. |
| Be this, however, as it may--for on this point our investigation is yet to be made--it is at least manifest from what we have said that cognition from principles is something very different from cognition by means of the understanding, which may indeed precede other cognitions in the form of a principle, but in itself--in so far as it is synthetical--is neither based upon mere thought, nor contains a general proposition drawn from conceptions alone shall comprehend |
| The understanding may be a faculty for the production of unity of phenomena by virtue of rules; the reason is a faculty for the production of unity of rules (of the understanding) under principles. |
| Reason, therefore, never applies directly to experience, or to any sensuous object; its object is, on the contrary, the understanding, to the manifold cognition of which it gives a unity a priori by means of conceptions--a unity which may be called rational unity, and which is of a nature very different from that of the unity produced by the understanding. |
| The above is the general conception of the faculty of reason, in so far as it has been possible to make it comprehensible in the absence of examples. |
| These will be given in the sequel. |
| B. OF THE LOGICAL USE OF REASON. |
| A distinction is commonly made between that which is immediately cognized and that which is inferred or concluded. |
| That in a figure which is bounded by three straight lines there are three angles, is an immediate cognition; but that these angles are together equal to two right angles, is an inference or conclusion. |
| Now, as we are constantly employing this mode of thought and have thus become quite accustomed to it, we no longer remark the above distinction, and, as in the case of the so-called deceptions of sense, consider as immediately perceived, what has really been inferred. |
| In every reasoning or syllogism, there is a fundamental proposition, afterwards a second drawn from it, and finally the conclusion, which connects the truth in the first with the truth in the second--and that infallibly. |
| If the judgement concluded is so contained in the first proposition that it can be deduced from it without the meditation of a third notion, the conclusion is called immediate (consequentia immediata); I prefer the term conclusion of the understanding. |
| But if, in addition to the fundamental cognition, a second judgement is necessary for the production of the conclusion, it is called a conclusion of the reason. |
| In the proposition; All men are mortal, are contained the propositions; Some men are mortal, Nothing that is not mortal is a man, and these are therefore immediate conclusions from the first. |
| On the other hand, the proposition; all the learned are mortal, is not contained in the main proposition (for the conception of a learned man does not occur in it), and it can be deduced from the main proposition only by means of a mediating judgement. |
| In every syllogism I first cogitate a rule (the major) by means of the understanding. |
| In the next place I subsume a cognition under the condition of the rule (and this is the minor) by means of the judgement. |
| And finally I determine my cognition by means of the predicate of the rule (this is the conclusio), consequently, I determine it a priori by means of the reason. |
| The relations, therefore, which the major proposition, as the rule, represents between a cognition and its condition, constitute the different kinds of syllogisms. |