| Cognition from principles, then, is that cognition in which I cognize the particular in the general by means of conceptions. |
| Thus every syllogism is a form of the deduction of a cognition from a principle. |
| For the major always gives a conception, through which everything that is subsumed under the condition thereof is cognized according to a principle. |
| Now as every general cognition may serve as the major in a syllogism, and the understanding presents us with such general a priori propositions, they may be termed principles, in respect of their possible use. |
| But if we consider these principles of the pure understanding in relation to their origin, we shall find them to be anything rather than cognitions from conceptions. |
| For they would not even be possible a priori, if we could not rely on the assistance of pure intuition (in mathematics), or on that of the conditions of a possible experience. |
| That everything that happens has a cause, cannot be concluded from the general conception of that which happens; on the contrary the principle of causality instructs us as to the mode of obtaining from that which happens a determinate empirical conception. |
| Synthetical cognitions from conceptions the understanding cannot supply, and they alone are entitled to be called principles. |
| At the same time, all general propositions may be termed comparative principles. |
| It has been a long-cherished wish--that (who knows how late), may one day, be happily accomplished--that the principles of the endless variety of civil laws should be investigated and exposed; for in this way alone can we find the secret of simplifying legislation. |
| But in this case, laws are nothing more than limitations of our freedom upon conditions under which it subsists in perfect harmony with itself; they consequently have for their object that which is completely our own work, and of which we ourselves may be the cause by means of these conceptions. |
| But how objects as things in themselves- how the nature of things is subordinated to principles and is to be determined. |
| according to conceptions, is a question which it seems well nigh impossible to answer. |
| Be this, however, as it may--for on this point our investigation is yet to be made--it is at least manifest from what we have said that cognition from principles is something very different from cognition by means of the understanding, which may indeed precede other cognitions in the form of a principle, but in itself--in so far as it is synthetical--is neither based upon mere thought, nor contains a general proposition drawn from conceptions alone shall comprehend |
| The understanding may be a faculty for the production of unity of phenomena by virtue of rules; the reason is a faculty for the production of unity of rules (of the understanding) under principles. |
| Reason, therefore, never applies directly to experience, or to any sensuous object; its object is, on the contrary, the understanding, to the manifold cognition of which it gives a unity a priori by means of conceptions--a unity which may be called rational unity, and which is of a nature very different from that of the unity produced by the understanding. |
| The above is the general conception of the faculty of reason, in so far as it has been possible to make it comprehensible in the absence of examples. |
| These will be given in the sequel. |
| B. OF THE LOGICAL USE OF REASON. |
| A distinction is commonly made between that which is immediately cognized and that which is inferred or concluded. |
| That in a figure which is bounded by three straight lines there are three angles, is an immediate cognition; but that these angles are together equal to two right angles, is an inference or conclusion. |