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The phrases in their context!

Extract from THE CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON

For this very permanence is the ground on which we apply the category of substance to the phenomenon; and we should have been obliged to prove that in all phenomena there is something permanent, of the existence of which the changeable is nothing but a determination.
But because a proof of this nature cannot be dogmatical, that is, cannot be drawn from conceptions, inasmuch as it concerns a synthetical proposition a priori, and as philosophers never reflected that such propositions are valid only in relation to possible experience, and therefore cannot be proved except by means of a deduction of the possibility of experience, it is no wonder that while it has served as the foundation of all experience (for we feel the need of it in empirical cognition), it has never been supported by proof.
A philosopher was asked; "What is the weight of smoke?" He answered; "Subtract from the weight of the burnt wood the weight of the remaining ashes, and you will have the weight of the smoke."
Thus he presumed it to be incontrovertible that even in fire the matter (substance) does not perish, but that only the form of it undergoes a change.
In like manner was the saying; "From nothing comes nothing," only another inference from the principle or permanence, or rather of the ever-abiding existence of the true subject in phenomena.
For if that in the phenomenon which we call substance is to be the proper substratum of all determination of time, it follows that all existence in past as well as in future time, must be determinable by means of it alone.
Hence we are entitled to apply the term substance to a phenomenon, only because we suppose its existence in all time, a notion which the word permanence does not fully express, as it seems rather to be referable to future time.
However, the internal necessity perpetually to be, is inseparably connected with the necessity always to have been, and so the expression may stand as it is.
Gigni de nihilo nihil; in nihilum nil posse reverti, * are two propositions which the ancients never parted, and which people nowadays sometimes mistakenly disjoin, because they imagine that the propositions apply to objects as things in themselves, and that the former might be inimical to the dependence (even in respect of its substance also) of the world upon a supreme cause.
But this apprehension is entirely needless, for the question in this case is only of phenomena in the sphere of experience, the unity of which never could be possible, if we admitted the possibility that new things (in respect of their substance) should arise.
For in that case, we should lose altogether that which alone can represent the unity of time, to wit, the identity of the substratum, as that through which alone all change possesses complete and thorough unity.
This permanence is, however, nothing but the manner in which we represent to ourselves the existence of things in the phenomenal world.
[*Footnote; Persius, Satirae, iii.83-84.]
The determinations of a substance, which are only particular modes of its existence, are called accidents.
They are always real, because they concern the existence of substance (negations are only determinations, which express the non-existence of something in the substance).
Now, if to this real in the substance we ascribe a particular existence (for example, to motion as an accident of matter), this existence is called inherence, in contradistinction to the existence of substance, which we call subsistence.
But hence arise many misconceptions, and it would be a more accurate and just mode of expression to designate the accident only as the mode in which the existence of a substance is positively determined.
Meanwhile, by reason of the conditions of the logical exercise of our understanding, it is impossible to avoid separating, as it were, that which in the existence of a substance is subject to change, whilst the substance remains, and regarding it in relation to that which is properly permanent and radical.
On this account, this category of substance stands under the title of relation, rather because it is the condition thereof than because it contains in itself any relation.
Now, upon this notion of permanence rests the proper notion of the conception change.
Origin and extinction are not changes of that which originates or becomes extinct.