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The phrases in their context!

Extract from THE CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON

But it is this that reason seeks for and requires.
It is only the principles of reason which can give to concordant phenomena the validity of laws, and it is only when experiment is directed by these rational principles that it can have any real utility.
Reason must approach nature with the view, indeed, of receiving information from it, not, however, in the character of a pupil, who listens to all that his master chooses to tell him, but in that of a judge, who compels the witnesses to reply to those questions which he himself thinks fit to propose.
To this single idea must the revolution be ascribed, by which, after groping in the dark for so many centuries, natural science was at length conducted into the path of certain progress.
We come now to metaphysics, a purely speculative science, which occupies a completely isolated position and is entirely independent of the teachings of experience.
It deals with mere conceptions--not, like mathematics, with conceptions applied to intuition--and in it, reason is the pupil of itself alone.
It is the oldest of the sciences, and would still survive, even if all the rest were swallowed up in the abyss of an all-destroying barbarism.
But it has not yet had the good fortune to attain to the sure scientific method.
This will be apparent; if we apply the tests which we proposed at the outset.
We find that reason perpetually comes to a stand, when it attempts to gain a priori the perception even of those laws which the most common experience confirms.
We find it compelled to retrace its steps in innumerable instances, and to abandon the path on which it had entered, because this does not lead to the desired result.
We find, too, that those who are engaged in metaphysical pursuits are far from being able to agree among themselves, but that, on the contrary, this science appears to furnish an arena specially adapted for the display of skill or the exercise of strength in mock-contests-- a field in which no combatant ever yet succeeded in gaining an inch of ground, in which, at least, no victory was ever yet crowned with permanent possession.
This leads us to inquire why it is that, in metaphysics, the sure path of science has not hitherto been found.
Shall we suppose that it is impossible to discover it?
Why then should nature have visited our reason with restless aspirations after it, as if it were one of our weightiest concerns?
Nay, more, how little cause should we have to place confidence in our reason, if it abandons us in a matter about which, most of all, we desire to know the truth--and not only so, but even allures us to the pursuit of vain phantoms, only to betray us in the end?
Or, if the path has only hitherto been missed, what indications do we possess to guide us in a renewed investigation, and to enable us to hope for greater success than has fallen to the lot of our predecessors?
It appears to me that the examples of mathematics and natural philosophy, which, as we have seen, were brought into their present condition by a sudden revolution, are sufficiently remarkable to fix our attention on the essential circumstances of the change which has proved so advantageous to them, and to induce us to make the experiment of imitating them, so far as the analogy which, as rational sciences, they bear to metaphysics may permit.
It has hitherto been assumed that our cognition must conform to the objects; but all attempts to ascertain anything about these objects a priori, by means of conceptions, and thus to extend the range of our knowledge, have been rendered abortive by this assumption.
Let us then make the experiment whether we may not be more successful in metaphysics, if we assume that the objects must conform to our cognition.
This appears, at all events, to accord better with the possibility of our gaining the end we have in view, that is to say, of arriving at the cognition of objects a priori, of determining something with respect to these objects, before they are given to us.