| Here then it appears, that of those three relations, which depend not upon the mere ideas, the only one, that can be traced beyond our senses and informs us of existences and objects, which we do not see or feel, is causation. |
| This relation, therefore, we shall endeavour to explain fully before we leave the subject of the understanding. |
| To begin regularly, we must consider the idea of causation, and see from what origin it is derived. |
| It is impossible to reason justly, without understanding perfectly the idea concerning which we reason; and it is impossible perfectly to understand any idea, without tracing it up to its origin, and examining that primary impression, from which it arises. |
| The examination of the impression bestows a clearness on the idea; and the examination of the idea bestows a like clearness on all our reasoning. |
| Let us therefore cast our eye on any two objects, which we call cause and effect, and turn them on all sides, in order to find that impression, which produces an idea, of such prodigious consequence. |
| At first sight I perceive, that I must not search for it in any of the particular qualities of the objects; since. |
| which-ever of these qualities I pitch on, I find some object, that is not possessed of it, and yet falls under the denomination of cause or effect. |
| And indeed there is nothing existent, either externally or internally, which is not to be considered either as a cause or an effect; though it is plain there is no one quality, which universally belongs to all beings, and gives them a title to that denomination. |
| The idea, then, of causation must be derived from some relation among objects; and that relation we must now endeavour to discover. |
| I find in the first place, that whatever objects are considered as causes or effects, are contiguous; and that nothing can operate in a time or place, which is ever so little removed from those of its existence. |
| Though distant objects may sometimes seem productive of each other, they are commonly found upon examination to be linked by a chain of causes, which are contiguous among themselves, and to the distant objects; and when in any particular instance we cannot discover this connexion, we still presume it to exist. |
| We may therefore consider the relation of CONTIGUITY as essential to that of causation; at least may suppose it such, according to the general opinion, till we can find a more [Part IV. SECT. 5.] proper occasion to clear up this matter, by examining what objects are or are not susceptible of juxtaposition and conjunction. |
| The second relation I shall observe as essential to causes and effects, is not so universally acknowledged, but is liable to some controversy. |
| It is that of PRIORITY Of time in the cause before the effect. |
| Some pretend that it is not absolutely necessary a cause should precede its effect; but that any object or action, in the very first moment of its existence, may exert its productive quality, and give rise to another object or action, perfectly co-temporary with itself. |
| But beside that experience in most instances seems to contradict this opinion, we may establish the relation of priority by a kind of inference or reasoning. |
| It is an established maxim both in natural and moral philosophy, that an object, which exists for any time in its full perfection without producing another, is not its sole cause; but is assisted by some other principle, which pushes it from its state of inactivity, and makes it exert that energy, of which it was secretly possest. |
| Now if any cause may be perfectly co-temporary with its effect, it is certain, according to this maxim, that they must all of them be so; since any one of them, which retards its operation for a single moment, exerts not itself at that very individual time, in which it might have operated; and therefore is no proper cause. |
| The consequence of this would be no less than the destruction of that succession of causes, which we observe in the world; and indeed, the utter annihilation of time. |
| For if one cause were co-temporary with its effect, and this effect with its effect, and so on, it is plain there would be no such thing as succession, and all objects must be co-existent. |