| Anger and hatred are passions inherent in Our very frame and constitutions. |
| The want of them, on some occasions, may even be a proof of weakness and imbecillity. |
| And where they appear only in a low degree, we not only excuse them because they are natural; but even bestow our applauses on them, because they are inferior to what appears in the greatest part of mankind. |
| Where these angry passions rise up to cruelty, they form the most detested of all vices. |
| All the pity and concern which we have for the miserable sufferers by this vice, turns against the person guilty of it, and produces a stronger hatred than we are sensible of on any other occasion. |
| Even when the vice of inhumanity rises not to this extreme degree, our sentiments concerning it are very much influenced by reflections on the harm that results from it. |
| And we may observe in general, that if we can find any quality in a person, which renders him incommodious to those, who live and converse with him, we always allow it to be a fault or blemish, without any farther examination. |
| On the other hand, when we enumerate the good qualities of any person. |
| we always mention those parts of his character, which render him a safe companion, an easy friend, a gentle master, an agreeable husband, or an indulgent father. |
| We consider him with all his relations in society; and love or hate him, according as he affects those, who have any immediate intercourse with him. |
| And it is a most certain rule, that if there be no relation of life, in which I coued not wish to stand to a particular person, his character must so far be allowed to be perfect. |
| If he be as little wanting to himself as to others, his character is entirely perfect. |
| This is the ultimate test of merit and virtue. |
| SECT. IV OF NATURAL ABILITIES |
| No distinction is more usual in all systems of ethics, than that betwixt natural abilities and moral virtues; where the former are placed on the same footing with bodily endowments, and are supposed to have no merit or moral worth annexed to them. |
| Whoever considers the matter accurately, will find, that a dispute upon this head would be merely a dispute of words, and that though these qualities are not altogether of the same kind, yet they agree in the most material circumstances. |
| They are both of them equally mental qualities: And both of them equally produce pleasure; and have of course an equal tendency to procure the love and esteem of mankind. |
| There are few, who are not as jealous of their character, with regard to sense and knowledge, as to honour and courage; and much more than with regard to temperance and sobriety. |
| Men are even afraid of passing for goodnatured; lest that should be taken for want of understanding: And often boast of more debauches than they have been really engaged in, to give themselves airs of fire and spirit. |
| In short, the figure a man makes in the world, the reception he meets with in company, the esteem paid him by his acquaintance; all these advantages depend almost as much upon his good sense and judgment, as upon any other part of his character. |
| Let a man have the best intentions in the world, and be the farthest from all injustice and violence, he will never be able to make himself be much regarded. |