| We are never to consider any single action in our enquiries concerning the origin of morals; but only the quality or character from which the action proceeded. |
| These alone are durable enough to affect our sentiments concerning the person. |
| Actions are, indeed, better indications of a character than words, or even wishes and sentiments; but it is only so far as they are such indications, that they are attended with love or hatred, praise or blame. |
| To discover the true origin of morals, and of that love or hatred, which arises from mental qualities, we must take the matter pretty deep, and compare some principles, which have been already examined and explained. |
| We may begin with considering a-new the nature and force of sympathy. |
| The minds of all men are similar in their feelings and operations; nor can any one be actuated by any affection, of which all others are not, in some degree, susceptible. |
| As in strings equally wound up, the motion of one communicates itself to the rest; so all the affections readily pass from one person to another, and beget correspondent movements in every human creature. |
| When I see the effects of passion in the voice and gesture of any person, my mind immediately passes from these effects to their causes, and forms such a lively idea of the passion, as is presently converted into the passion itself. |
| In like manner, when I perceive the causes of any emotion, my mind is conveyed to the effects, and is actuated with a like emotion. |
| Were I present at any of the more terrible operations of surgery, it is certain, that even before it begun, the preparation of the instruments, the laying of the bandages in order, the heating of the irons, with all the signs of anxiety and concern in the patient and assistants, would have a great effect upon my mind, and excite the strongest sentiments of pity and terror. |
| No passion of another discovers itself immediately to the mind. |
| We are only sensible of its causes or effects. |
| From these we infer the passion: And consequently these give rise to our sympathy. |
| Our sense of beauty depends very much on this principle; and where any object has atendency to produce pleasure in its possessor, it is always regarded as beautiful; as every object, that has a tendency to produce pain, is disagreeable and deformed. |
| Thus the conveniency of a house, the fertility of a field, the strength of a horse, the capacity, security, and swift-sailing of a vessel, form the principal beauty of these several objects. |
| Here the object, which is denominated beautiful, pleases only by its tendency to produce a certain effect. |
| That effect is the pleasure or advantage of some other person. |
| Now the pleasure of a stranger, for whom we have no friendship, pleases us only by sympathy. |
| To this principle, therefore, is owing the beauty, which we find in every thing that is useful. |
| How considerable a part this is of beauty can easily appear upon reflection. |
| Wherever an object has a tendency to produce pleasure in the possessor, or in other words, is the proper cause of pleasure, it is sure to please the spectator, by a delicate sympathy with the possessor. |