| By what fiction we apply the idea of time, even to what is unchangeable, and suppose, as is common, that duration is a measure of rest as well as of motion, we shall consider [Sect 5.] afterwards. |
| There is another very decisive argument, which establishes the present doctrine concerning our ideas of space and time, and is founded only on that simple principle, that our ideas of them are compounded of parts, which are indivisible. |
| This argument may be worth the examining. |
| Every idea, that is distinguishable, being also separable, let us take one of those simple indivisible ideas, of which the compound one of extension is formed, and separating it from all others, and considering it apart, let us form a judgment of its nature and qualities. |
| It is plain it is not the idea of extension. |
| For the idea of extension consists of parts; and this idea, according to t-he supposition, is perfectly simple and indivisible. |
| Is it therefore nothing? That is absolutely impossible. |
| For as the compound idea of extension, which is real, is composed of such ideas; were these so many non-entities, there would be a real existence composed of non-entities; which is absurd. |
| Here therefore I must ask, What is our idea of a simple and indivisible point? No wonder if my answer appear somewhat new, since the question itself has scarce ever yet been thought of. |
| We are wont to dispute concerning the nature of mathematical points, but seldom concerning the nature of their ideas. |
| The idea of space is conveyed to the. |
| mind by two senses, the sight and touch; nor does anything ever appear extended, that is not either visible or tangible. |
| That compound impression, which represents extension, consists of several lesser impressions, that are indivisible to the eye or feeling, and may be called impressions of atoms or corpuscles endowed with colour and solidity. |
| But this is not all. |
| It is not only requisite, that these atoms should be coloured or tangible, in order to discover themselves to our senses; it is also necessary we should preserve the idea of their colour or tangibility in order to comprehend them by our imagination. |
| There is nothing but the idea of their colour or tangibility, which can render them conceivable by the mind. |
| Upon the removal of the ideas of these sensible qualities, they are utterly annihilated to the thought or imagination. |
| Now such as the parts are, such is the whole. |
| If a point be not considered as coloured or tangible, it can convey to us no idea; and consequently the idea of extension, which is composed of the ideas of these points, can never possibly exist. |
| But if the idea of extension really can exist, as we are conscious it does, its parts must also exist; and in order to that, must be considered as coloured or tangible. |
| We have therefore no idea of space or extension, but when we regard it as an object either of our sight or feeling. |