| Again, pride and love are agreeable passions; hatred and humility uneasy. |
| This similitude of sensation betwixt pride and love, and that betwixt humility and hatred form a new connexion, and may be considered as the other two sides of the square. |
| Upon the whole, pride is connected with humility, love with hatred, by their objects or ideas: Pride with love, humility with hatred, by their sensations or impressions. |
| I say then, that nothing can produce any of these passions without bearing it a double relation, viz, of ideas to the object of the passion, and of sensation to the passion itself. |
| This we must prove by our experiments. |
| First Experiment. |
| To proceed with the greater order in these experiments, let us first suppose, that being placed in the situation above-mentioned, viz, in company with some other person, there is an object presented, that has no relation either of impressions or ideas to any of these passions. |
| Thus suppose we regard together an ordinary stone, or other common object, belonging to neither of us, and causing of itself no emotion, or independent pain and pleasure: It is evident such an object will produce none of these four passions. |
| Let us try it upon each of them successively. |
| Let us apply it to love, to hatred, to humility, to pride; none of them ever arises in the smallest degree imaginable. |
| Let us change the object, as oft as we please; provided still we choose one, that has neither of these two relations. |
| Let us repeat the experiment in all the dispositions, of which the mind is susceptible. |
| No object, in the vast variety of nature, will, in any disposition, produce any passion without these relations. |
| Second Experiment. |
| Since an object, that wants both these relations can never produce any passion, let us bestow on it only one of these relations; and see what will follow. |
| Thus suppose, I regard a stone or any common object, that belongs either to me or my companion, and by that means acquires a relation of ideas to the object of the passions: It is plain, that to consider the matter a priori, no emotion of any kind can reasonably be expected. |
| For besides, that a relation of ideas operates secretly and calmly on the mind, it bestows an equal impulse towards the opposite passions of pride and humility, love and hatred, according as the object belongs to ourselves or others; which opposition of the passions must destroy both, and leave the mind perfectly free from any affection or emotion. |
| This reasoning a priori is confirmed by experience. |
| No trivial or vulgar object, that causes not a pain or pleasure, independent of the passion, will ever, by its property or other relations either to ourselves or others, be able to produce the affections of pride or humility, love or hatred. |
| Third Experiment. |
| It is evident, therefore, that a relation of ideas is not able alone to give rise to these affections. |