| The utmost we can pretend to is a description of them, by an enumeration of such circumstances, as attend them: But as these words, PRIDE and humility, are of general use, and the impressions they represent the most common of any, every one, of himself, will be able to form a just idea of them, without any danger of mistake. |
| For which reason, not to lose time upon preliminaries, I shall immediately enter upon the examination of these passions. |
| It is evident, that pride and humility, though directly contrary, have yet the same OBJECT. |
| This object is self, or that succession of related ideas and impressions, of which we have an intimate memory and consciousness. |
| Here the view always fixes when we are actuated by either of these passions. |
| According as our idea of ourself is more or less advantageous, we feel either of those opposite affections, and are elated by pride, or dejected with humility. |
| Whatever other objects may be comprehended by the mind, they are always considered with a view to ourselves; otherwise they would never be able either to excite these passions, or produce the smallest encrease or diminution of them. |
| When self enters not into the consideration, there is no room either for pride or humility. |
| But though that connected succession of perceptions, which we call SELF, be always the object of these two passions, it is impossible it can be their CAUSE, or be sufficient alone to excite them. |
| For as these passions are directly contrary, and have the same object in common; were their object also their cause; it coued never produce any degree of the one passion, but at the same time it must excite an equal degree of the other; which opposition and contrariety must destroy both. |
| It is impossible a man can at the same time be both proud and humble; and where he has different reasons for these passions, as frequently happens, the passions either take place alternately; or if they encounter, the one annihilates the other, as far as its strength goes, and the remainder only of that, which is superior, continues to operate upon the mind. |
| But in the present case neither of the passions coued ever become superior; because supposing it to be the view only of ourself, which excited them, that being perfectly indifferent to either, must produce both in the very same proportion; or in other words, can produce neither. |
| To excite any passion, and at the same time raise an equal share of its antagonist, is immediately to undo what was done, and must leave the mind at last perfectly calm and indifferent. |
| We must therefore, make a distinction betwixt the cause and the object of these passions; betwixt that idea, which excites them, and that to which they direct their view, when excited. |
| Pride and humility, being once raised, immediately turn our attention to ourself, and regard that as their ultimate and final object; but there is something farther requisite in order to raise them: Something, which is peculiar to one of the passions, and produces not both in the very same degree. |
| The first idea, that is presented to the mind, is that of the cause or productive principle. |
| This excites the passion, connected with it; and that passion, when excited. |
| turns our view to another idea, which is that of self. |
| Here then is a passion placed betwixt two ideas, of which the one produces it, and the other is produced by it. |
| The first idea, therefore, represents the cause, the second the object of the passion. |
| To begin with the causes of pride and humility; we may observe, that their most obvious and remarkable property is the vast variety of subjects, on which they may be placed. |