| that inclination of our fancy by which we are determined to incorporate the taste with the extended object, and our reason, which shows us the impossibility of such an union. |
| Being divided betwixt these opposite principles, we renounce neither one nor the other, but involve the subject in such confusion and obscurity, that we no longer perceive the opposition. |
| We suppose, that the taste exists within the circumference of the body, but in such a manner, that it fills the whole without extension, and exists entire in every part without separation. |
| In short, we use in our most familiar way of thinking, that scholastic principle, which, when crudely proposed, appears so shocking, of TOTUM IN TOTO & TOLUM IN QUALIBET PARTE: Which is much the same, as if we should say, that a thing is in a certain place, and yet is not there. |
| All this absurdity proceeds from our endeavouring to bestow a place on what is utterly incapable of it; and that endeavour again arises from our inclination to compleat an union, which is founded on causation, and a contiguity of time, by attributing to the objects a conjunction in place. |
| But if ever reason be of sufficient force to overcome prejudice, it is certain, that in the present case it must prevail. |
| For we have only this choice left, either to suppose that some beings exist without any place; or that they are figured and extended; or that when they are incorporated with extended objects, the whole is in the whole, and the whole in every part. |
| The absurdity of the two last suppositions proves sufficiently the veracity of the first. |
| Nor is there any fourth opinion. |
| For as to the supposition of their existence in the manner of mathematical points, it resolves itself into the second opinion, and supposes, that several passions may be placed in a circular figure, and that a certain number of smells, conjoined with a certain number of sounds, may make a body of twelve cubic inches; which appears ridiculous upon the bare mentioning of it. |
| But though in this view of things we cannot refuse to condemn the materialists, who conjoin all thought with extension; yet a little reflection will show us equal reason for blaming their antagonists, who conjoin all thought with a simple and indivisible substance. |
| The most vulgar philosophy informs us, that no external object can make itself known to the mind immediately, and without the interposition of an image or perception. |
| That table, which just now appears to me, is only a perception, and all its qualities are qualities of a perception. |
| Now the most obvious of all its qualities is extension. |
| The perception consists of parts. |
| These parts are so situated, as to afford us the notion of distance and contiguity; of length, breadth, and thickness. |
| The termination of these three dimensions is what we call figure. |
| This figure is moveable, separable, and divisible. |
| Mobility, and separability are the distinguishing properties of extended objects. |
| And to cut short all disputes, the very idea of extension is copyed from nothing but an impression, and consequently must perfectly agree to it. |
| To say the idea of extension agrees to any thing, is to say it is extended. |