| And indeed, if we consider the matter aright, it is scarce possible it should be otherwise, nor is it conceivable that our senses should be more capable of deceiving us in the situation and relations, than in the nature of our impressions. |
| For since all actions and sensations of the mind are known to us by consciousness, they must necessarily appear in every particular what they are, and be what they appear. |
| Every thing that enters the mind, being in reality a perception, it is impossible any thing should to feeling appear different. |
| This were to suppose, that even where we are most intimately conscious, we might be mistaken. |
| But not to lose time in examining, whether it is possible for our senses to deceive us, and represent our perceptions as distinct from ourselves, that is as external to and independent of us; let us consider whether they really do so, and whether this error proceeds from an immediate sensation, or from some other causes. |
| To begin with the question concerning EXTERNAL existence, it may perhaps be said, that setting aside the metaphysical question of the identity of a thinking substance, our own body evidently belongs to us; and as several impressions appear exterior to the body, we suppose them also exterior to ourselves. |
| The paper, on which I write at present, is beyond my hand. |
| The table is beyond the paper. |
| The walls of the chamber beyond the table. |
| And in casting my eye towards the window, I perceive a great extent of fields and buildings beyond my chamber. |
| From all this it may be infered, that no other faculty is required, beside the senses, to convince us of the external existence of body. |
| But to prevent this inference, we need only weigh the three following considerations. |
| First, That, properly speaking, it is not our body we perceive, when we regard our limbs and members, but certain impressions, which enter by the senses; so that the ascribing a real and corporeal existence to these impressions, or to their objects, is an act of the mind as difficult to explain, as that which we examine at present. |
| Secondly, Sounds, and tastes, and smelts, though commonly regarded by the mind as continued independent qualities, appear not to have any existence in extension, and consequently cannot appear to the senses as situated externally to the body. |
| The reason, why we ascribe a, place to them, shall be: considered afterwards. |
| Thirdly, Even our sight informs us not of distance or outness (so to speak) immediately and without a certain reasoning and experience, as is acknowledged by the most rational philosophers. |
| As to the independency of our perceptions on ourselves, this can never be an object of the senses; but any opinion we form concerning it, must be derived from experience and observation: And we shall see afterwards, that our conclusions from experience are far from being favourable to the doctrine of the independency of our perceptions. |
| Mean while we may observe that when we talk of real distinct existences, we have commonly more in our eye their independency than external situation in place, and think an object has a sufficient reality, when its Being is uninterrupted, and independent of the incessant revolutions, which we are conscious of in ourselves. |
| Thus to resume what I have said concerning the senses; they give us no notion of continued existence, because they cannot operate beyond the extent, in which they really operate. |
| They as little produce the opinion of a distinct existence, because they neither can offer it to the mind as represented, nor as original. |
| To offer it as represented, they must present both an object and an image. |