| Suppose I see the legs and thighs of a person in motion, while some interposed object conceals the rest of his body. |
| Here it is certain, the imagination spreads out the whole figure. |
| I give him a head and shoulders, and breast and neck. |
| These members I conceive and believe him to be possessed of. |
| Nothing can be more evident, than that this whole operation is performed by the thought or imagination alone. |
| The transition is immediate. |
| The ideas presently strike us. |
| Their customary connexion with the present impression, varies them and modifies them in a certain manner, but produces no act of the mind, distinct from this peculiarity of conception. |
| Let any one examine his own mind, and he will evidently find this to be the truth. |
| Secondly, Whatever may be the case, with regard to this distinct impression, it must be allowed, that the mind has a firmer hold, or more steady conception of what it takes to be matter of fact, than of fictions. |
| Why then look any farther, or multiply suppositions without necessity? |
| Thirdly, We can explain the causes of the firm conception, but not those of any separate impression. |
| And not only so, but the causes of the firm conception exhaust the whole subject, and nothing is left to produce any other effect. |
| An inference concerning a matter of fact is nothing but the idea of an object, that is frequently conjoined, or is associated with a present impression. |
| This is the whole of it. |
| Every part is requisite to explain, from analogy, the more steady conception; and nothing remains capable of producing any distinct impression. |
| Fourthly, The effects of belief, in influencing the passions and imagination, can all be explained from the firm conception; and there is no occasion to have recourse to any other principle. |
| These arguments, with many others, enumerated in the foregoing volumes, sufficiently prove, that belief only modifies the idea or conception; and renders it different to the feeling, without producing any distinct impression. |
| Thus upon a general view of the subject, there appear to be two questions of importance, which we may venture to recommend to the consideration of philosophers, Whether there be any thing to distinguish belief from the simple conception beside the feeling of sentiment? And, Whether this feeling be any thing but a firmer conception, or a faster hold, that we take of the object? |
| If, upon impartial enquiry, the same conclusion, that I have formed, be assented to by philosophers, the next business is to examine the analogy, which there is betwixt belief, and other acts of the mind, and find the cause of the firmness and strength of conception: And this I do not esteem a difficult task. |
| The transition from a present impression, always enlivens and strengthens any idea. |